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Abstract 
The historicist approach to science has been accompanied by a culturalist one in the last decade or 
two. Epistemic localism added a horizontal axis to the existing vertical (historical) one thus science 
came to be presented in a coordinate system as a manifold of epistemic traditions. Taking the debate 
about the existence of the N-ray as an instructive example, I argue that the historical development of 
science creates disciplinary communities that impose unified epistemic standards on the communities 
scrutinizing the same aspects of reality. Accordingly, with the advent of such communities relativism 
became one-dimensional: science has developed into a historically changing culture that puts up a 
successful fight against epistemic diversity in its synchronous dimension. 
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Introduction: Two kinds 
of cultural relativism 
The historical approach to science in the middle 
of the last century revealed that scientists in dif-
ferent eras use incompatible concepts, methodo-
logical norms and epistemological standards for 
constructing and justifying scientific knowledge. 
Sociologists and geographers of the last decades 
went on with this destruction of the unity of sci-
ence claiming that scientific knowledge “... is not 
to be thought of as some transcendent entity 
that bears no trace of the parochial or contingent. 
It needs, rather, to be qualified by temporal and 
regional adjectives” (Livingstone, 2003: 13, my 
italics). Thereby a “geographical” or “spatial turn” 
has been added to the historical one, creating a 
new dimension of relativism in science. The pro-
tagonists of this spatialist approach agree that the 
“... issues of space – location, place, site, migration, 
region – are at the heart of scientific endeavour” 
(Livingstone, 2003: 5, my emphases) and with “the 
‘geographical turn’ evident across science studies 
... different geographies of science are emerging” 
(Powell, 2007: 309). The addition of this further 
“turn” to the already existing ones is meant to 
indicate that concepts and standards of science 
vary with regions, therefore “just as there is a rich 
history of science, so there is a rich geography of 
science” (Withers and Livingstone, 2011: 3). It is 
claimed that the “... processes of knowledge pro-
duction” require “judgements and negotiations 
by groups of scientists in specific contexts”. Accord-
ingly, cartographers of science take on the task to 
reveal “the specific sites” at which “... particular sci-
entists with particular skills, materials, tools, theo-
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ries and techniques” (Turnbull, 2002: 6, my italics) 
produce locally authenticated beliefs. 
The same cultural relativism can be found in 
contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge 
as well. From the fact that this knowledge is “fabri-
cated and negotiated by particular agents at a 
particular time and place”, some sociologists come 
to the conclusion that it is “local rather than univer-
sally valid” (Knorr-Cetina, 1981: 33, my italics). Their 
conclusion is based on the premise that human 
reason and empirical evidence in themselves 
are epistemically not powerful enough, so they 
conceive knowledge in general as an “amalgam of 
experiences and socially mediated beliefs” (Bloor, 
1976: 12). The social mediation of beliefs is concre-
tised as setting up justificatory systems authorised 
by particular communities, therefore they look 
for “the specific local causes of credibility” (Barnes 
and Bloor 1982: 23 – my italics). Which beliefs are 
given credit depends on the epistemic standards 
a community deploys thus belief and knowledge 
differ not in the latter’s being justified (and true), 
but in its being “collectively endorsed” (Bloor, 
1976: 2-3), hence epistemic justification is to be 
replaced by acceptance (Bloor, 1976: 2-3). 
The anthropological treatment 
of local relativism
Naturally, “spatiality” (just like “temporality”) itself 
cannot be more than just a synecdoche: spatial or 
temporal coordinates have nothing to do with 
the justification of beliefs. What does have such 
an impact is the epistemic system people use for 
assessing statements. It is an “assemblage of 
principles and procedures that a given society or 
culture ... relies on, explicitly or implicitly, in distin-
guishing justified from unjustified beliefs...” (Wil-
liams, 2007: 94). It is often said that “e]pistemic 
systems vary from culture to culture...” (Williams, 
2007: 94), but this does not involve that “culture” is 
synonymous with “being separated by a physical 
distance”. There are different cultures in the same 
geographical region and the other way round, 
people unified by the same (sub)-culture may not 
be living in the same place. People of the same sci-
entific school, tradition, paradigm etc. can adhere 
to the same commitments independent of their 
temporal or geographical location. Platonism, 
for instance, can be taken as an epistemic system 
accepted by people not belonging to the same 
historical era or geographical area. Certainly, cul-
tural relativism used to be coupled with spatiality 
while communication, hence the authorisation of 
particular standards, presupposed direct, unmedi-
ated communication and interactions. Thus in the 
course of history epistemic systems differed due 
to their physical separateness, but geographical 
distance is not a necessary condition of such dif-
ferences. What is necessary is a community that 
shares customs, traditions and authority structure 
that empowers the standards and adjudicates 
whether in concrete cases they are observed.
Such communities may materialize in contem-
porary science without their members being 
separated by physical distance (Longino, 2002; 
Coliva and Pedersen, 2017). However, the cultural 
relativism such communities generate is not easy 
to reconcile with the cognitive success of science 
hence attempts have been made to explain the 
cooperation among such traditions. One of the 
most ingenious of them was put forward by P. 
Galison who argued that the prima facie fragmen-
tariness of science is a consequence of identifying 
holistic unities that make “unbridgeably isolated” 
knowledge blocks, “island empires” (Galison, 
1997a: 17-18) using “incommensurable languages 
... without a common divisor” (Galison, 2010: 
42). He suggests that this vision is induced by 
the assumption that science must be a compact 
culture integrating theory, experimentation and 
instrumentation. Scientists themselves perceive 
their situation differently, therefore they do not 
worry about relativism. They can put up with the 
fact that science falls into more or less discrete 
subcultures, because they experience that, 
despite the incommensurable languages they use, 
their communities can escape “the methodolog-
ical and philosophical commitment to relativism” 
(Galison, 2010: 42). The relatively independent, 
but partially overlapping communities, no matter 
where their members are geographically located, 
share concepts and practices enough to allow 
rational communication. Taking neighbouring 
lay cultures as his model, Galison describes the 
interfaces between separate scientific communi-
ties as “trading zones” where collaboration and 
repeated attempts at communication create inter-
languages by a hybridisation of the particular 
idioms. Admittedly, such inter-languages provide 
4only partial competence, but Galison claims 
that it is enough for mutual understanding and 
eschewing “block relativism” (Galison, 1997a: 14). 
A slightly different still similar approach was 
suggested by Collins and Evans who distinguished 
between “contributory” and “interactive expertise”, 
claiming that while the former presupposes full 
participation in the research process, the latter 
can be acquired by joining in discussions and 
collaboration with the competent speakers of the 
community to be understood (Collins and Evans, 
2015, 2016). The interactive expertise obtained 
this way is restricted again, but enough for partial 
understanding and it allows discussion that can 
result in bridging over the conceptual gaps. 
Galison, Collins and Evans alike use the 
cultural anthropological model of mediation 
between alien cultures for soothing the severe 
consequences of localist relativism in science. 
The shared aim of the conceptual innovations 
of “trading zone” and “interactive expertise” is 
to explain how mutual (though partial) under-
standing can be created by local interactions 
without homogenising the global conceptual 
schemes of the parties. Seeing the similarity of 
their pursuits, M. E. Gorman (Gorman, 2002), then 
Collins, Evans and Gorman together (Collins et al., 
2007; cf. Collins et al., 2017) came up with the idea 
that by the combination of Galison’s and Collins 
and Evans’ ideas we can gain a framework suitable 
for dealing with incommensurable traditions and 
making thereby the inter- and multidisciplinary 
research possible (in what follows I refer to this as 
‘G–C-E framework’). 
I would argue that the anthropological method 
the G–C-E framework suggests may be suitable for 
handling the semantic problems caused by incon-
gruent conceptual apparatuses, but it leaves the 
door open for epistemic relativism. The framework 
makes use of the linguistic and interactive 
relations of the communities: shared observable 
situations and interactions can help accommo-
date incongruent concepts and interpretations. 
Epistemic relativism, however, is caused by the 
incongruity of the deep-rooted standards by 
which evidence are gained from the observable 
situations and the epistemic merits of asser-
tions are determined. Since these are culturally 
ingrained commitments, understanding of them is 
not identical with accepting their validity, hence 
the G–C-E framework alone is not sufficient for 
overcoming cultural relativism. 
In what follows, I argue that science is a special 
culture that includes an urge to homogenise the 
epistemic system used. I present my position by 
means of a case study revealing how contradic-
tory statements concerning a new kind of electro-
magnetic radiation were treated at the beginning 
of the 20th century. The case itself is known (see 
Blondlot, 1905a; Klotz, 1980, 1986; Langmuir, 1989; 
Nye, 1980, 1986; Seabrook, 1941), hence I am not 
going to rehearse all its details. I only highlight the 
features that the standard history leaves obscure 
though they shed light on the mechanism of 
epistemic homogenisation.
The rise of a local tradition 
Here is the bald summary of the official story: In 
spring 1903, R. Blondlot announced the discovery 
of a new radiation that he named N-ray. After sev-
eral failed attempts to replicate his experiments 
by other physicists, R. W. Wood visited Blondlot’s 
laboratory and conducted there an experimentum 
crucis that empirically refuted this claim. “Wood 
rather cruelly published what happened in the 
laboratory. And that was the end of Blondlot” 
(Langmuir, 1989: 43).
The received explanation of the issue is that, 
tricked by his strong expectations, an individual 
scientist imagined seeing signs (namely bright-
ness-changes of sparks) that in fact were not there. 
Thus he fell prey to self-delusion. As a matter of 
fact, however, the N-ray story was much more 
complicated than its standard rendering makes us 
believe. It is worth taking a look at the details.1 
1.  The existence of the N-ray fitted very well in the 
knowledge context of the era: 
More than one kind of radiation (X-ray, alpha-, 
beta- and gamma-ray, natural radioactivity) 
had been discovered in the preceding years, 
hence a further one could be expected. 
2.  Blondlot’s and others’ results went through the 
official filters of science:
A huge number of papers were published 
about the topic in peer reviewed scientific jour-
nals (120 researchers published about 300 
papers in a short period of time). 
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lications, experimental evidence and successful 
applications, one does not see a solitary scientist’s 
self-delusion. What can be seen is rather a hot 
research area, a rapidly developing interdiscipli-
nary field that quickly produces experimentally 
reinforced, quantified results promising solutions 
to several previously irresolvable problems. As 
the community constituted by the endorsement 
of Blondlot’s methods consisted of researchers 
working in north-France (University of Nancy; the 
Sorbonne, the Institut Général Psychologique; 
Académie des Sciences in Paris), I am going to 
refer to it as the N-F community. Let us see how 
other scientists reacted on the claims this commu-
nity published. 
Failed attempts at an 
experimental replication 
Several physicists at different laboratories in Ger-
many, England and the USA (the G–A community, 
for short) made several abortive attempts to repli-
cate the published experiments. The failures were 
explained in two different ways.
 
1) Incompatibility with the received knowledge 
Some accounts referred to the irreconcilability 
of Blondlot’s experimental results with the then 
known properties of radiations. H. Rubens, for 
instance, warned that Blondlot’s assertion that 
the N-ray is an electromagnetic radiation of long 
wavelength that travels through a 0.1 mm win-
dow was incompatible with Maxwell’s theory (Nye, 
1980: 131). According to G. Sagnac’s calculations 
the wavelength of the N-ray must have been so 
long that it could not pass through the quartz lens 
Blondlot used (Nye, 1980: 132). The properties of 
the N-ray were incompatible with V. Schumann’s 
discovery from which it followed that the air and 
the quartz lens would completely absorb a radia-
tion with the given properties therefore it could 
not have been seen without a vacuum spectro-
graph (which Blondlot did not use). C. C. Schenk 
(1904) pointed out that if the beams traverse a 5 
mm wide slit then after passing through the prism 
they must become so broad that their intensity 
will considerably decrease therefore they cannot 
be separated from each other. He concluded that 
“under the conditions of the experiment it would 
Lectures were delivered about the N-ray at the 
French Academy of Sciences and in prestigious 
learned societies. 
Indeed, the significance of the discovery 
became so obvious that even priority debates 
broke out among scientists (Le Bon, Audollet, 
Huter vs. Charpentier). 
3.  The hypothesis was explanatorily remarkably 
successful:
An until that time unexplainable phenomenon 
(the increased visual sensitivity of patients suf-
fering from hysteria) became explainable by 
the N-ray. 
The N-ray promised to explain parapsycho-
logical phenomena in a physicalist manner (A. 
d’Arsonval came up with a physicalist account 
for the aura alleged to surround human body; 
Kéraval offered an explanation of telepathy by 
N-rays). 
4.  Most importantly, the discovery was empirically 
massively reinforced: 
The experiments were successfully replicated 
(at least 40 researchers demonstrated experi-
mentally the existence of the N-ray between 
1903 and 1906). 
Several scientists managed to specify, extend 
and elaborate Blondlot’s discovery and new sci-
entific problems were inspired by it (why certain 
materials radiate and others do not etc.). 
The presence of the N-ray was experimentally 
demonstrated in other fields: first in physiology 
then in psychology (A. Charpentier found that 
human nervous system emits such radiation; di 
Brazza claimed to have discovered rays emitted 
by the active brain). 
d’Arsonval experimentally localised the source 
of emission in the Broca-centre of the brain. 
A quantitative correlation was found between 
the intensity of the physical–psychical activities 
and the strength of the radiation emitted by 
the human body. 
By increasing mental or physical activity, physi-
ologists seemed able to manipulate causally the 
emission and the quantity of the N-ray. 
J. Becquerel’s control experiments showed that 
anaesthetisation of the nerves and contraction 
of the muscles can suppress N-ray emission. 
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rate beams at all” (Schenk, 1904: 487). 
The gist of these objections was that Blondlot’s 
experimental results contradicted the received 
physical knowledge of the day therefore it could 
be a priori known that such rays could not exist. 
This argument, however, was not conclusive for 
two reasons:
a)  As mentioned above, other experimenters rein-
forced Blondlot’s outcomes, hence despite the 
a priori arguments, there was a posteriori evi-
dence for it. 
b)  Radiation-physics at that time was a new field 
thus the so-called “received” knowledge was 
not confirmed firmly enough to adjudicate 
Blondlot’s outcomes by it. Accordingly, Blond-
lot was quick to reverse the argument: the 
incompatibility of his experimental outcomes 
with the theory suggests that something is 
wrong with the received knowledge, therefore 
the strange properties of the N-ray indicate 
that he had hit upon something important. So 
when Wood expressed doubts that “a ray bun-
dle 3 mm in width could be split up into a spec-
trum with a maxima and minima less than 0.1 
mm apart...”, he responded that “this was one 
of the inexplicable and astounding properties 
of the rays” (Wood, 1904: A 82–86).2 
2) Concerns about the method
Several members of the G–A community were 
tempted to think that the bizarre properties are 
to be taken as evidence that the experiments had 
gone wrong. Thus, taking up Schenk’s invitation 
that the scientific community should “... direct 
attention ... to certain experimental precautions 
not sufficiently observed ... by Blondlot” (Schenk, 
1904: 486) the second group of arguments tar-
geted the experimental method Blondlot applied. 
a)  O. Lummer gave a lecture in the Deutsche Physi-
kalische Gesellschaft (Nov. 1903) in which he 
argued that the brightenings the experiment-
ers sensed were due to the different light-sensi-
tivities of the cones and rods of their retina, thus 
the whole phenomenon was but some illusion 
(Lummer, 1904a: 280). In the discussion that 
took place at the 76. Naturforscherversammlung 
zu Breslau in 1904, he concretised his objection 
claiming that until the N-ray was objectively 
justified, he (together with H. Rubens) reserved 
the right to attribute the phenomena exclu-
sively to physiological and psychological causes 
(Lummer and Weiss, 1904: 676). Eventually, at 
the sitting of the Deutsche Physikalische Gesells-
chaft he explicitly declared that “Blondlot’s 
experiments may be almost exactly imitated 
in their effects without employing any source of 
illumination whatever” (Lummer, 1904b: 378, my 
italics). This meant that Blondlot’s experimental 
method was not objective because he failed 
to exclude the experimenter’s distorting effect 
from his experiments.
b)  A. A. Swinton was not as harsh. He admitted 
that the brightness of the screen changed, but 
experimentally demonstrated that this was 
caused by the heat of the instruments (Nernst 
lamp, Auer burner) used (Swinton, 1904: 412). 
Thus, contrary to Lummer, he “proved” that 
there was an external cause, it only was not the 
N-ray. This again meant that the experiment 
was technically sloppy because Blondlot took a 
noise to be a sign. 
c)  S. Hooker conducted a control experiment 
keeping a container filled with hot water close 
to the screen, but he found that “there was 
absolutely no brightening” (Hooker, 1904: 686). 
On the other hand, putting the screen among 
the branches of a mimosa plant he experienced 
increased luminosity, thus he concluded that 
organic beings and what he called “human ray” 
caused the brightening. With this he not only 
admitted the presence of an external cause, 
but came quite close to Charpentier’s, di Braz-
za’s, and d’Arsonval’s “physiological radiation” 
that they had identified as N-ray. 
In sum, these experiments brought incompatible 
results that, contrasted with the successful repli-
cations of the N-F community, gave the impres-
sion that the discussion about the existence of the 
N-ray have reached a deadlock. 
Breaking into the 
experimenter’s regress 
The G–A community did not acquiesce in this 
thus they opened a new line of attack. They took 
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fail to see the brightenings because of their “lack 
of sensitiveness” (Wood, 1904: A 32–33) to mean 
that his experiments presuppose some extraor-
dinary ability. Swinton noted with a tongue in 
cheek that “those who have unsuccessfully tried 
the experiments can only imagine that ... they are 
only visible to certain individuals” (Swinton, 1904: 
412, my italics). Others went sarcastic: “I am at a 
loss to find any other explanation of M. Blond-
lot’s result than that he has come across a radia-
tion to which some men are blind and others not so” 
wrote J. B. Burke (Burke, 1904a: 365 – my italics). 
It was he who in another paper called the N-ray 
a “mysterious” phenomenon (Burke, 1904b: 198) 
and repeated this qualification at the 74th meeting 
of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science where he gave an account of his efforts 
to reveal the nature of this “mysterious radiation” 
(Discussion, 1905: 468). The efforts mentioned 
included an investigation in which he “had tried 
the vision of numerous persons, but in no case was 
there satisfactory evidence of any external action 
upon the sight” (Discussion, 1905: 468). This was 
again a clear allusion to the extraordinary ability 
that Blondlot was thought to had made a precon-
dition of proving the existence of the N-ray. Even-
tually, A. Turpain declared boldly that “if the N-rays 
can only be observed by privileged rarities, then they 
no longer belong to the domain of experimenta-
tion” (quoted by Nye, 1980: 144, my italics). Read-
ing Wood’s report about his visit to Blondlot we 
see that he was not free of this “expectation bias” 
at all: he went to see the laboratory “in which the 
apparently peculiar conditions necessary for the 
manifestation of this most elusive form of radia-
tion appear to exist” (Wood 1904: A 6-8, my italics).
This pushing the N-F community toward irra-
tionalism seemed to allow a spectacular solution 
to the problem of contradictory experimental 
results. The instrument Blondlot used came to 
be conceived as being composed of two parts: 
one physical (the spectroscope) and one human 
(Blondlot’s mysterious sensitivity). Since the 
G–A community used a different (exclusively 
physical) instrument, the data the two commu-
nities produced were in fact not incompatible, 
but simply different. To demonstrate this, in the 
darkened laboratory Wood allegedly took the 
prism out of the spectroscope. This trick disabled 
the physical part of the instrument, leaving just 
the human one that even according to Blondlot 
detected only what the physical part projected 
on the screen. In Wood’s report, Blondlot went on 
reading the spectrum of the refracted N-ray as if 
nothing had happened. So the fact that he saw 
the non-existing effects proved that not his visual 
ability, but another of his faculties, namely his 
imagination worked there, thus the data he saw 
were irrelevant. 
Mentioning Wood’s taking out the prism I 
used the adverb “allegedly” because the only 
documentation we have of this action is what M. 
Ashmore called “the tale of the Removal of the 
Prism” (Ashmore, 1993: 67). As he pointed out, 
we have to rely exclusively on Wood’s testimony 
concerning when the prism was in or out and 
how these physical states correlated with what 
Blondlot said he was seeing. Wood claimed he had 
taken the prism out of the spectroscope thus no 
visible spectrum could exist; Blondlot, however, 
continued to see the spectrum therefore he was 
sure that the prism must have been in place (cf. 
Ashmore, 1993: 86). This means that Wood simply 
replaced the original problem (whether the repli-
cated experiments failed to show N-rays because 
there is no such radiation, or because Blondlot’s 
experiences were caused by experimental slop-
piness) with a new equally undecidable one 
(how Blondlot’s claims were related to the prism’s 
alleged ins and outs). 
The situation was what later came to be called 
the “experimenter’s regress” (Collins, 1992: 83-89). 
The disagreement between the two communi-
ties seemed irresolvable by the standard means 
of science: Blondlot’s positive results could be 
valid detections and other physicists’ inability to 
replicate could be caused by their using an inap-
propriate (exclusively physical) instrument – or the 
other way round: their instrument was adequate 
and they did not see the N-ray because it did not 
exist. The question at that time was undecidable. 
All the less, because by its rash publication Wood’s 
act became irreplicable as well, since after what 
happened, Blondlot (or other N-rayists) could not 
be expected to report their private sensations of 
extremely delicate stimuli with the original unsus-
pecting innocence (cf. Ashmore, 1993: 90).
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menter’s regress is to find “a criterion ... which 
is independent of the output of the experi-
ment itself” (Collins, 1992: 83). Wood found 
such a criterion, namely the authority of the G–A 
community that approved his “tale of the Removal 
of the Prism” as a scientific demonstration of the 
fact that Blondlot’s complex equipment was 
inappropriate. Thereby the G–A community was 
justified in saying that the N-ray did not exist since 
the proper instrument could not detect it.
Notice that this breaking into the experiment-
er’s regress was made possible by two factors:
a)  The G–A community’s endorsement of the “tale 
of the Removal of the Prism”, and
b)  the community’s interpretation of Blondlot’s 
words on the visual capacity needed for the 
success of the experiment. 
It is obvious that without the G–A community’s 
authoritative support Wood’s procedure would 
never have qualified as a “scientific” proof, let 
alone an experimentum crucis. He unabashedly 
presented conditional formulations of unjusti-
fied assumptions as incontrovertible evidence: 
“It appears to me that it is quite possible that...” 
(Wood, 1904: A 52–56, my emphasis), or “I feel very 
sure that if a series of experiments were made... the 
source of error would be found” (Wood, 1904: A 
62–67, my emphasis). In vain produced Blondlot 
photos showing an increased brightness on the 
unshielded half of photo-sensitive plates exposed 
to the N-rays, they were brushed off with the 
remark that the photos “were made, it seems to 
me, under conditions which admit many sources 
of error...” (Wood, 1904: A 44–45, my italics). He 
completed rhetorical manipulation and neglect 
of facts with wild exaggeration. According to the 
report, when Blondlot was asked to indicate when 
he saw changes in the brightness while Wood was 
alternately blocking the source of the N-ray, “in no 
case was a correct answer given” (Wood, 1904: A 
36–37 – my italics), and Blondlot “was almost 100 
per cent wrong” (Wood, 1904: B 14, my emphasis). 
In a similar test “in no case was a correct answer 
given...” (Wood, 1904: A 36–37, my italics). Even 
if we assume that, seeing no real signals, Blond-
lot gave random answers, Wood still would have 
owed an explanation why the usual probability 
distribution of random choices was so extremely 
distorted. He, however, did not have to care about 
even the most basic requirements of an empirical 
refutation. The G–A community backed unani-
mously his claim that this action was the “crucial 
and most exciting test” (Wood, 1904: B 25) prov-
ing that Blondlot could not see traces of the N-ray. 
The same went for the short and quick 
concluding part of the “falsification process”. 
Having spent hardly more than three hours in 
Blondlot’s laboratory, Wood returned to Paris 
and next day he sent a report to the Nature. 
Leaving all the usual precautions aside, this was 
published immediately. There was no peer review 
process, the report came out as a “letter to the 
editor”. Despite providing no detailed account 
of a systematic and repeatable test, the report 
was immediately given full credence. Indeed, it 
was republished in leading scientific journals of 
the field in quick succession (September: Nature, 
October: Revue Scientifique, December: Physi-
calische Zeitschrift) making sure that everyone 
concerned be authoritatively informed about the 
debunking. The whole action was carried out in 
a desperate hurry and was in startling contradic-
tion with the advertised “organised scepticism” 
of science: the meeting in Cambridge at which 
Wood’s visit was decided took place in late August 
1904. He visited Blondlot’s lab 21st September, 
and his letter in the Nature came out the 29th. The 
completing phase of the whole N-ray affair was 
then the consolidation of the contemporaneous 
interpretation. Historians of science subsumed the 
case under the category of “pathological science” 
(Langmuir, 1989). 
What was at stake? 
Considering the importance of the question 
whether there was or there was not a further kind 
of electromagnetic radiation one finds difficult 
to comprehend why such a large-scale opera-
tion was launched. Not a fundamental theory was 
refuted, both the existence and the non-existence 
of the N-ray fitted perfectly into the basic physical 
views of the era. Thus it is not easy to get rid of 
the conjecture that the serial of publications in the 
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demonstration.
To see what happened, recall that Blondlot’s 
opponents spoke about some mysterious ability 
he allegedly relied on. In fact, however, Blondlot 
never referred to any extraordinary capacity. What 
he said was that the stimuli in the N-ray experi-
ment were just above the human perceptual 
threshold, therefore the observer should look at 
the screen as “an ‘impressionist’ painter”, and that 
“to attain this requires some practice, and is not an 
easy task” (Blondlot, 1905b: 83, my italics). That 
some sensations require previous practice was not 
an unheard idea in the psychology of sensation at 
that time. Blondlot even quoted Helmholtz saying 
that certain sensations “demand much practice 
and consequently many facts of this nature 
cannot even be observed without long prelimi-
nary practice ... On many points, therefore, we are 
restricted to the observations of very few individ-
uals” (Blondlot, 1904: 24211). He echoed this last 
sentence saying “a few person succeed at once, 
others after more or less practice ... a few never 
succeed” (Blondlot, 1904: 24211). It is perfectly 
clear that his remarks on the personal differences 
in seeing referred to an acquirable skill and not to 
some extraordinary gift. 
Anyhow, skills were not admitted into the 
methodology of experimental physics of the time 
either. The idea that the success of an experiment 
depends on the active intervention of the experi-
menter seemed so absurd to the contemporaries 
that it overshadowed the difference between an 
inborn ability and a learnable skill. At that time, 
to use one’s personal skill appeared a serious 
deviation from the norm that the cognitive 
process should be strictly separated from the 
subjectivity of the epistemic agent. This was the 
taken-for-granted conception of the “mechanical 
objectivity” (Daston and Galison, 2007: 115-190) 
that dominated the 19th and early 20th century 
science. The physicists were convinced that the 
experimenter must act as a “will-less machine”, 
like a camera that was believed “... to offer images 
uncontaminated by interpretation” (Daston and 
Galison, 2007: 121, 139). 
To put it bluntly, the N-F and G–A communi-
ties were committed to different epistemic systems. 
Their debate was not about a contingent fact 
(whether there is N-ray or not), but about the 
legitimate epistemic standards to be used for the 
justification of scientific claims in experimental 
physics. They had no conceptual problems, 
they shared their cognitive aims, values, theo-
retical backgrounds, and were committed to the 
general method of experimental justification, 
to which they deployed standard instruments. 
They ascribed identical meanings to the crucial 
terms like ‘radiation’, ‘electromagnetism’, ‘spectro-
scope’, ‘wavelength’, ‘prism’ etc., still they assigned 
contrary epistemic values to the claim “the N-ray 
exists”. The standards of objectivity they used 
differed in at least three interconnected respects:
a)  What does the objectivity demand: the mechan-
ical exclusion of the experimenter or rather a 
participative attitude?
b)  Consequently, what is the appropriate attitude 
of the epistemic agent: should s/he be passive or 
interventionist?
c) What is to be regarded a proper experimental 
instrument: is it exclusively physical or can it be 
supplemented by human skills?
These standards determine the conditions under 
which experimentally produced beliefs count as 
justified, consequently the one concerning the 
existence of N-ray may take opposite, but equally 
rationally certified epistemic values. The partisans 
of the mechanical objectivity found it blatantly 
obvious that “objective” meant “being determined 
exclusively by the investigated object” and any 
interference of the epistemic agent leads to preju-
diced, biased, therefore subjective results. Lum-
mer concretised this general conviction when 
he declared that the existence of the N-ray could 
only be admitted if it was “incontestably proved 
by means of objective instruments of precision” 
(Lummer, 1904b: 380, my emphasis). Blondlot real-
ised that in order to be an objective instrument 
the spectroscope needs to be completed with a 
trained eye capable of noticing feeble signs, dis-
cern subtle differences, distinguish between sign 
and noise. Without such a skill, he thought, the 
spectroscope did not show the fine effects of real-
ity on the screen therefore it was not an “objec-
tive instrument of precision”. Indeed, because of 
their taken-for-granted principle of mechanical 
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objectivity, Blondlot’s opponents were not in the 
position to be able to debate his claims by empiri-
cal arguments. As it expressly forbade them to 
acquire the necessary skill, they could not be sure 
that the screen in fact did not brighten or their 
eyes were simply not sensitive enough to notice 
its actual brightenings. That is why Wood had to 
resort to an indirect argument claiming that the 
“tale of the removal of the prism” proved that his 
imagination deluded Blondlot, therefore it did not 
matter what sensations he had.
Briefly, both Blondlot and his opponents could 
rationally think they proved their case by objective 
experimental data. Objectivity, however, meant 
different things for them so they justified their 
contradicting propositions by applying different 
standards. That is exactly what we usually call 
epistemic relativism that, according to Boghos-
sian (2006), is comprised of three interconnected 
theses:
1)  “Epistemic non-absolutism”: there are no objec-
tive empirical data or logical inferences that 
unequivocally justify a belief. 
2)  “Epistemic relationism”: the epistemic value is 
always related to some epistemic system. 
3)  “Epistemic pluralism”: “There are many funda-
mentally different genuinely alternative epis-
temic systems, but no facts by virtue of which 
one of these systems is more correct than any 
of the others” (Boghossian, 2006: 73). 
The G–A community put up a naive defence 
against relativism attempting to refute the first 
thesis by presupposing the absolute cognitive 
power of reason and/or experience. They hoped 
that, like in he case of semantic relativism, by the 
observation of the situations in that beliefs arise 
and by the application of rational assessment they 
gain uniform justified beliefs, thereby the second 
thesis becomes invalid, hence the third irrelevant. 
When such attempts fail, usually there seems to 
remain no alternative but to admit that “there are 
no absolute proofs to be had that one scientific 
theory is superior to another: there are only locally 
credible reasons” (Bloor, 1999: 102). As an expres-
sion of a general theoretical position this assertion 
may be true. Applied specifically to science, how-
ever, the expression “locally credible reasons” calls 
for a special interpretation. 
Was experimental physics at the beginning of 
the 20th century in fact pursued by communities 
that could cherish their own “epistemic norms” 
lending “local credibility” (Seidel, 2014: 143)? Not 
at all. The contemporary physicists sprang to the 
defence of the consensual standards of objec-
tivity. The quick and easy approval of Wood’s 
fishy debunking, the replacement of argumen-
tation with rhetoric, the hasty publication of the 
dubious “refutations”, and the neglect of the differ-
ence between an inborn gift and an acquired skill 
demonstrates that epistemic relativism was not 
considered a viable option. The physicists of the 
G–A community did not look upon themselves as 
representatives of one of the possible epistemic 
systems, but as the guardians of scientificity and 
rationality as such. This suggests that science 
makes an exceptional sort of culture in which the 
inference from non-absolutism to localism is not 
automatically licensed.
Local communities and 
disciplinary cultures
Galison is convinced that the attitude of tolerant 
discussion and cooperation between incommen-
surable cultures of science “offers an alternative 
both to the picture of crazy-quilt fragmentation 
and to one of homogenous unification” (Galison, 
1997a: 51, my italics). Accordingly, as the G–A and 
N-F communities had “distinct cultures” (Galison, 
1997a: 51) with “differences in classification, sig-
nificance, and standards of demonstration” (Gali-
son, 1999: 146, my italics), their integration would 
have required some hybrid language facilitating 
rational “exchanges (coordination), worked out in 
exquisite local detail, without global agreement” 
(Galison, 1997a: 46). In fact, however, we find no 
attempt either at establishing it or at obtaining 
interpretive expertise. What could have been a 
better occasion for such a local coordination than 
the téte-a-téte between Wood and Blondlot? Still, 
no attempt was made at that. What happened 
was a rather belligerent intervention and a truc-
ulent disqualification of the deviant standards 
and their advocates. Instead of steering a middle 
course between fragmentation and unification we 
see a hard push for the latter. 
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Looking for an explanation we find the differ-
ence between understanding the meaning of 
sentences expressing beliefs and justifying the 
normativeness of epistemic standards. The two 
groups had no problems with the former, but 
did not even try to come to terms with the 
latter. The rational resolution would have taken 
arguments and reasons, however, the binding 
force of arguments and reasons would have 
been provided by the very standards they were 
expected to be arguments and reasons for. So the 
usual ingredients (genuinely different epistemic 
standards + “norm-circularity” (Seidel, 2014: 
137-138) of epistemic relativism were given. 
The impossibility of a metajustification of one of 
the set of standards prevented a rational debate 
between the two groups. This, however, did not 
lead to epistemic relativism. As Kusch puts it, “[a]ll 
forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves 
to the view that it is impossible to show in neutral, 
non-question begging way that one ‘epistemic 
system’ (...) is epistemically superior to (all) others.” 
(Kusch, 2017: 4687). These, however, are the philo-
sophical conditions only. Their presence provides 
only the necessary but not the sufficient condi-
tions of a local relativism.
The epistemic standards are “fundamental 
commitments which are (...) immune to rational 
evaluation” (Pritchard, 2016: 66, my italics) hence 
their endorsement presupposes a culture, 
tradition, customs or socialisation. This seems to 
match the main argument for the extension of 
cultural relativism onto science, namely that “... 
science is not above culture; it is part of culture” 
(Livingstone, 2003: 180). This seems to entail rela-
tivism since as there are different human cultures 
there must be scientific traditions as well that 
differ from each other in their entrenched commit-
ments to various epistemic systems. I argue, 
however, that science is a special kind of culture 
that does not tolerate diverse commitments at the 
same time. 
The reason is that contemporary Western 
science consists of disciplines that have been 
getting unified since the 17th century on. An 
integral part of the disciplinary cultures this histor-
ical process has brought about is the principle that 
no synchronous alternative epistemic systems are 
tolerated. The unity is not established or preserved 
by reference to neutral experience and universal 
reason: it is consensual, historically changing and 
is confined to disciplines. But it creates shared 
commitments.
The unification I refer to is certainly, not that 
complete one the neopositivists dreamt about. 
Their reductionism, verificationism, and meth-
odologism are not part of the project. It is 
acknowledged that reality may be too complex to 
approach every region of it by the same methods. 
Further, it is not imagined that every research 
groups should take the same particular metaphys-
ical assumptions for granted and it is not hoped 
that scientific research will eventually produce a 
grand unified theory of the world (Dupré, 1993; 
Cartwright, 1999.). The unification I have in mind 
concerns the epistemic systems (Seidel, 2014; 
Kusch, 2017) or methodological assumptions 
(Longino, 2002: 184-189) that select and evaluate 
evidence and assess scientific statements. This 
unification is not based on philosophical criteria, 
it is rather a historical process that brings about 
“arational hinge commitments” (Pritchard, 2016: 
89-103) confined to disciplines. The N-ray case is 
revealing because it makes visible how, despite 
lacking some higher-level epistemological 
principle, the majority of the experimental physics 
community defends the epistemic unity of their 
discipline by imposing their uniform standards of 
objectivity upon a deviant minority. 
Spatial – local
The unification of the disciplines is a historical 
process entailed by the development of commu-
nication that creates place-independent commu-
nities. It seems natural to think that local scientific 
communities come about from the unification of 
individual efforts. People of the same geographi-
cal region who are beset with similar problems 
compare the ideas and methods they individually 
hit upon, select the best ones, complete, correct, 
reinforce or refute each other’s views. Thus indi-
vidual researchers get unified into local epistemic 
communities kept together by personal relations. 
When spatialists describe science they seem 
to have such communities in mind: “science is 
always an ancient Chinese, a medieval Islamic, 
an early modern English, a Renaissance French, a 
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Jeffersonian American, an Enlightenment Scottish 
thing...” (Livingstone, 2003: 13). When, however, 
they form their general thesis about the localist 
nature of science they assume, without offering 
any reason, that the integration process stopped 
at the level of the local communities. Why would 
it be so? Certainly, there were contingent practical 
reasons for the existence of isolated local commu-
nities until communication among distant regions 
was technically difficult and rare. When, however, 
the facilities of travel, correspondence and publi-
cation created dense communicational connec-
tions among physically remote communities the 
process that brought them about simply went 
on. Urged by curiosity, the spirit of competi-
tion, the quest for learning, etc. people doing 
philosophy of nature in Europe tended to get 
in touch in an increasing measure from the 17th 
century on. Correspondence, visits, public experi-
ments, journals, learned societies and academies 
connected these people irrespective of the 
geographical place they happened to live in. 
Invisible colleges emerged that, as described by 
Price and Crane, are loose, informal assemblages 
of people, held together by intellectual proximity: 
regular communication, exchange of preprints, 
conferences, visits, sameness of the literature read 
etc. 
This spontaneously emerging epistemic 
homogeneity became institutionalised in the 20th 
century when a worldwide institutional system 
(universities, academies, learned societies, peer 
review system etc.) was developed (Drori et al., 
2003; Schofer, 2004). This system takes care of 
the selection and preservation of the epistemic 
standards of science by:
a)  A standardised knowledge-transmission system 
that ensures uniform cognitive socialization. 
b)  An artificial virtual space for constant communi-
cation: journals, conferences, workshops etc. 
c)  A constant migration of persons. Scholarships, 
visiting scientists, workshops, conferences, 
summer schools etc. keep up dynamic personal 
contacts, blend ideas and practices. 
d)  The strict separation of the local contexts of 
discovery and the global context of justifica-
tion ensures that the locally embraced results 
have to gain accreditation from the whole dis-
ciplinary community, therefore justification 
must observe the actually endorsed non-local 
criteria.
Thus, despite being unable to offer philosophical 
arguments for the unity of science as such, we can 
observe a historical process and an institutional 
system that bring about the epistemic unity of 
the researchers dealing with the same problems. 
Ironically, despite emphasizing that “a whole body 
of recent empirical and theoretical work” shows 
“the local, situated and embedded nature of sci-
ence” (Shapin, 1998: 6), spatialists tend to over-
look the historical and institutional homogenising 
tendencies. The historians of science are certainly 
justified in their focusing “on the local institutional 
setting of science ... and on the particularities of the 
practice that characterise it” (Golinski, 1998: 55). 
This attitude, however, became obsolete with 
the emergence of disciplinary communities with 
which cultural relativism ceased to coincide with 
spatialism in science. Thanks to the communica-
tional connections, it was no longer important 
where scientists were geographically located. 
What made them an epistemic community was 
that their practices were entrenched in non-local 
institutions that made them conceptually, meth-
odologically and epistemologically united. 
Before outlining how this change effected non-
geographical localism in science it will be useful to 
distinguish between three senses of the adjective 
“local” in epistemic contexts:
LOC1  The most fundamental sense of localism is 
non-absolutism: “Rational evaluation is ... an 
essentially local activity, one that always 
take place relative to arational hinge com-
mitments” Pritchard 2016, 103). Pritchard 
calls this the “essential locality of rational 
evaluation”. This locality is strictly epis-
temic and means that all epistemic evalua-
tion presupposes some epistemic system.
LOC2  Cultural relativism was first motivated by 
the spatial meaning of localism. Norms are 
developed by geographically isolated com-
munities hence the beliefs’ credibility is 
provided by “specific local causes” (Barnes 
and Bloor, 1982: 23).
LOC3  Finally, localism is contrasted with “global 
relativism” that includes every sphere of 
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culture (moral, cognitive, aesthetic etc.). 
Contrasted with this, local relativism means 
that one is relativist “with respect to some 
designated domains” (Krausz, 2011: 74) 
where more than one genuinely different 
epistemic system prevail. 
With this conceptual articulation in hand we can 
refine the general statement that the only “char-
acteristics all knowledge systems share is local-
ness” (Watson-Verran and Turnbull, 1995: 116). It 
is especially important if “localness” is applied to 
science. Scientific disciplines are obviously local 
in the first sense: theories and statements can-
not be assessed “simpliciter” (McKenna, 2017: 172) 
only in the context of some epistemic system. As 
indicated, science ceased to be local in the sec-
ond, spatialist sense by the emergence of the dis-
ciplinary communities. In what follows, I intend 
to argue that scientific disciplines are not local in 
the third sense either, i.e. the concretised version 
of the above statement, namely that the “funda-
mental characteristic of scientific knowledge is its 
localness” (Turnbull, 1996: 6) does not apply to 
the scientific disciplines. My claim is that different 
epistemic standards may turn up in disciplinary 
communities, but their existence is transitory only, 
the synchronous unity of the fundamental com-
mitments is preserved. 
The no-tolerance principle 
in disciplines
Why I claim that the differences of standards are 
transitory in disciplines is shown by the N-ray case. 
At first glance the incompatible experimental out-
comes back the localist claim that it is “useful to 
talk about the difference in cultures between the 
interacting groups that participate in physics” 
(Galison, 1997b: 669, my italics). However, the cru-
elty of the eradication of this discrepancy is a clear 
sign that the culture of science does not tolerate 
synchronous subcultures in the same field for 
long. 
Why science is intolerant in this respect is 
understandable from the fact that its main char-
acteristic since the emergence of disciplinary 
communities is non-individuality: knowledge 
is manufactured by a series of interactions like 
collaboration, critique, adjudication, making use 
of data produced by others, evaluation of claims 
to decide about publication, grants, jobs etc. The 
consequence of the constant interactions is the 
emergence of a shared stock of ideas, a conven-
tional set of standards, concepts, authorities, 
common practices, and standard techniques. 
Certainly, science is a complicated epistemic 
activity, thus the consensus is never complete, 
groups may establish local standards, schools 
and local traditions may come about. Evidence 
may be insufficient to decide about metaphys-
ical assumptions or about the effectiveness of 
a methodological innovation. Rival hypotheses 
and alternative methods may coexist for a while, 
conceptual, and methodological innovations are 
suggested etc. However, the necessary diversifica-
tion of expertise, the effectiveness of the distribu-
tion of cognitive labour, the enormous quantities 
of data, huge instruments, escalating costs of 
research, and coordinated research programmes 
of different laboratories make constant communi-
cation and interaction inevitable among the scien-
tists pursuing the same discipline. 
Division of labour, collaboration and competi-
tion are the conditions of producing the best 
humanly possible knowledge of reality, therefore 
science cannot consent to incompatible views 
justified by local commitments in the long run. 
Disciplinary communities cannot acquiesce in 
domain relativism because the incompatibility 
of standards prevents cooperation and compe-
tition that are fundamental constituents of this 
culture and are the preconditions of its cognitive 
success. The researchers who want to rely on 
or criticise the theories and data produced by 
other research teams, or want their own results 
be used by others, have to adjust themselves to 
shared non-local standards. That is why one of the 
principal norms of this culture is to seek homo-
geneity of fundamental cognitive principles of 
rationality, justification, and objectivity. Variations 
are kept under constant pressure and in the long 
run they are fitted in the general patterns of inter-
action at any cost: “… one can understand inves-
tigative, or scientific, communities as constituted 
around selections of substantive and methodo-
logical assumptions. These selections are a function 
of both the aims of research and inherited tradition” 
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(Longino, 2002: 186, my emphasis). We have seen 
that when the N-F community did not fit into the 
inherited tradition of mechanical objectivity it 
was forced to return to the discipline’s “inherited 
tradition”. 
As I read it, the N-ray case opens a window on 
the historical period when the experimental phys-
icists’ unified disciplinary community emerged. 
Referring to the 19th century Britain scene, Living-
stone could rightly say that “Bristol science, 
Manchester science, and Newcastle science are 
not the same as science in Bristol, science in 
Manchester, or science in Newcastle. The place-
name adjectives in these designations attest 
to scientific practices that were constituted in 
different ways by different urban cultures” (Living-
stone, 2003: 108). By the beginning of the 20th 
century, however, these cultural differences have 
disappeared from experimental physics. Physi-
cists working in Baltimore, Breslau, or London 
discussed the results produced in Nancy as if 
they had been in the same town. The epistemic 
homogeneity of the discipline was considered so 
important that it was defended without seeking 
a fair mediation between the G–E and the local 
N-F sub-cultures. No trace of a Galisonian “trading 
zone”, of an “intermediate domain in which proce-
dures could be coordinated locally even where 
broader meanings clashed” (Galison, 1997a: 46) 
can be seen. No attempt was made at developing 
an “interactive expertise” by getting into concrete 
practical and communicative interactions with the 
competent local speakers (Collins, 2004). Instead, 
it was made abundantly clear that the decision 
about what qualified as “acceptable method,” 
“reliable instrument,” “confirming evidence”, 
“proper experimentation”, and “criteria of objec-
tivity” was kept under control by the majority of the 
disciplinary community, and if it intended to be 
part of this culture, the a local community had to 
go by them. And it did. 
The N-F community undoubtedly regarded 
itself as part of the same culture of experimental 
physics as the G–A community. Blondlot and 
his colleagues never claimed they pursued a 
different cognitive venture: they regarded their 
discovery as an addition to the then known kinds 
of radiation; they published their results in the 
common forums (journals, conferences) of this 
culture and their ambition was to have it accepted 
by the international community. Their results were 
produced and justified by the standard instru-
ments and in the standard laboratories of the 
experimental physics, and when Wood asked for 
Blondlot’s collaboration in checking his results, 
he was ready to receive him right away and 
agreed to conduct experiments together. After 
Wood’s accusation that they broke the norms of 
experimentation, the N-F community did not 
put up a resistance. Not everybody went as far 
as J. Becquerel who, forgetting about his earlier 
experiments with the N-ray, suddenly realised 
that “the purely subjective method employed for 
testing the effects of the N-ray is antiscientific” 
(Nye, 1986: 74). Still, the majority tacitly withdrew 
and prudently changed their field of research. No 
one replied “we have our own tradition”, “we use 
different standards” or “our claims are just as true 
as those of the G–A community”. They readily 
admitted that they belonged to the overall culture 
of science and could not apply local standards.
Naturally, discovery in science is often induced 
by local factors like authorities, patterns, traditions, 
co-presence of like-minded people and instru-
ments existing in a local community (Henke and 
Gieryn, 2008). Thus we can say that “knowledge is 
constructed in specifically designed and enclosed 
space” (Golinski, 1998: 98). Cases like the N-ray or 
cold fusion, however, clearly show that after the 
emergence of the disciplinary community it is no 
longer true that “place matters in the way scien-
tific claims come to be regarded as true, in how 
theories are established and justified” (Livingstone, 
2003: 13, my italics). In vain established the N-F 
community a firm local consensus, in vain were 
Blondlot’s experiments replicated there, this was 
far from scientific justification. The accreditation 
process took place in the abstract space created 
by Nature, Lancet, Scientific American, Revue Scien-
tifique, Physicalische Zeitschrift, and other journals 
and conferences, and was executed by the broad 
community of experimental physicists. 
There was a clear sign of the disciplinary unity 
of the experimental physics. Lummer remarked 
in the Berliner Ophtamologische Gesellschaft’s 
assembly in February 1904 that “up to now only 
the French researchers have seen those rays” 
(Lummer, 1904a: 280). A bit later an anonym 
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author in the Scientific American put it more 
sharply: “... why English and German scientists 
have been uniformly unsuccessful in detecting 
the strange emanations ... and why French physi-
cists ... furnish more convincing proof of their 
existence every day”? (Scientific American, 1904: 
434). The realisation of the locality of justification 
could have suggested the presence of “paradigms 
that pass each other like ships in the night” 
(Galison, 1997a: 13), however, the thought that a 
group of physicists had created an autonomous 
local tradition with particular methods of justifi-
cation did not even cross anybody’s mind. On the 
contrary, the very fact that somebody was sent to 
Blondlot’s laboratory to check the experiment on 
the spot, and that Wood expected “peculiar condi-
tions” in the laboratory (Wood, 1904: A 6–8, my 
italics), made manifest the suspicion that it was 
not a “placeless place” (Kohler, 2002) as proper 
science would have required. Surfacing the non-
replicability by standard methods caused a crisis 
and was considered as “one of those scientific 
anomalies for which no adequate explanation can 
ever be offered” (Scientific American, 1904: 434, my 
emphasis). The understanding of the situation as 
an unexplainable “anomaly” instead of a differ-
ence between epistemically equal, domain 
specific “local traditions”, clearly shows that at 
the beginning of the 20th century experimental 
physics was already conceived as a unified disci-
pline with shared fundamental commitments. 
And the N-ray hypothesis was treated accordingly. 
We can theoretically (practically often not) 
accept that there are multiple ways of living, 
customs, morals, religious and political views, 
schools of art, i.e. that broadly dissimilar lay 
cultures can exist next to each other, without even 
attempting to reach agreement concerning vital 
questions. Not so in particular scientific disciplines 
whose ideal aim is the true or at least the instru-
mentally most effective description, the deepest 
possible understanding and the most compre-
hensive explanation of nature. The only chance to 
achieve it is interaction that is made impossible 
by the plurality of epistemic standards. Epistemic 
relativism is irreconcilable with the collabora-
tive and competitive practice of disciplines 
therefore the diversity of standards is tolerated 
only as long as it is inevitable. The members of 
this culture are socialized to make every effort 
to unify their epistemic norms to make possible 
cooperation, division of intellectual labour and 
critique. The sub-communities that want to have 
their results accredited have to take part in the 
selection process that in the long run lets stand 
only one epistemic system at a time for a disci-
plinary community. That happened in the N-ray 
case. Despite their mutual understanding the 
two communities continued to maintain their 
contradictory views about the existence of N-ray. 
As the epistemic standards they used were not 
rationally discussable, the unification did not 
happen by argumentation: the majority imposed 
its standards on the local community by power to 
restore the unity of the discipline. 
Conclusion: the one-dimensionality 
of scientific relativism 
According to the general definition of epistemic 
relativism, “knowledge is relative ... because dif-
ferent cultures, societies, epochs, etc. accept dif-
ferent sets of background principles, criteria, and/
or standards of evaluation for knowledge-claims, 
and there is no neutral way of choosing between 
these alternative sets of standards” (Siegel, 2011: 
201). Like the definitions of relativism in general, 
this one as well focuses on the impossibility of 
choosing rationally among the possible alterna-
tive epistemic systems. Epistemic relativists regu-
larly assume that since norms and criteria solidify 
in communal processes that bring about customs 
and traditions historical and cultural relativism are 
on a par. The process is the same no matter that 
the commitments come about by the change 
of time, physical distance or by the formation of 
a particular school. Thus historical and cultural 
relativism is usually regarded different only in 
their “emphasis on the diachronic rather than the 
synchronic dimensions of the determinants of 
thought and action” (Baghramian, 2004: 6, my 
italics). 
My argument was that in science this does 
not mean that one can pick any of the theoreti-
cally possible systems. Historians claiming that 
the history of science “is on the cusp of a transfor-
mation that is about to leave us with a growing 
number of local historiographies of science” 
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(Nappi, 2013: 103) seem right. Indeed, pessimistic 
induction suggests that the present methodo-
logical norms of physics may radically change in 
the future, hence historical relativism seems a well-
founded phenomenon. However, the acknowl-
edgment of the systematic “... relationships 
between thought and its social setting” (Ophir and 
Shapin, 1991: 9) does not entail synchronous rela-
tivism in the disciplines of science. 
Disciplines does not establish a synchronous 
unity by the assumed universality of experience 
(protocol language) or by the inborn general 
norms of rationality, not even by the G–C-E 
framework. Here the unity is created by the 
necessary interactivity of the cognitive process 
and by the matching “social setting”, namely by 
the institutions of science. Science is a practi-
cally and communicationally unified cognitive 
machinery that brings about synchronously 
universal epistemic systems in its disciplines. 
Thus it is not to be denied that social causes 
play a pivotal role in the assessment of scientific 
beliefs, and that “true” is replaced by “warranted” 
or “credible in a community” (Bloor, 1999: 84). But 
the “causes of belief” that elicit credibility (Bloor, 
1999: 84) in science are local only in the sense of 
epistemic non-absolutism (LOC1), but not in the 
spatialist (LOC2) or domain-relativist (LOC3) sense. 
In other words, relativism remains a legitimate 
historiographical norm, inevitable if one wants to 
escape presentism. We should, however realise 
that the examples spatialists come up with are 
examples of “historical geography” that do not 
prove at all that a “geography of contemporary 
science” should exist. No matter if they work in 
CERN, in Stanford, or in Tsukuba high energy phys-
icists cooperate, discuss theoretical questions, 
share experimental data, and exchange experts 
without difficulty. This suggests that speaking 
specifically of scientific knowledge we should 
distinguish two types of relativism.
1)  The cognitive culture we call “scientific” is 
a historical development, the validity of its 
standards is based on consensus and as such 
it can change substantially in time. Therefore 
historical relativism does apply to scientific 
cognition. The standard examples of the Aris-
totelian, Newtonian and Einsteinan physics, 
phlogiston chemistry etc. can be completed by 
the case of the N-ray: Wood refuted Blondlot’s 
claim by showing that he failed the standards 
of mechanical objectivity. These standards 
themselves, however, had to be abandoned 
soon. In the first decades of the 20th century 
new instruments were introduced for observ-
ing beams, waves, sub-atomic particles, electric 
and magnetic fields: screens displaying fluores-
cent lights, cloud chambers showing the visible 
tracks of electrically charged particles, EEG for 
recording the electrical activity of the brain etc. 
These instruments showed flickering lights, 
shimmerings on screens, photos and charts 
with very complex and entangled patterns, 
whose discern and interpretation demanded 
trained eyes. The epistemically naive principle 
of “use objective instruments only” or “inborn 
natural sensational capacities ensure objec-
tivity” did not work any longer. By the middle 
of the century it has become accepted that 
experimental practice, observation, language, 
and calculation alike involve a tacit dimension 
(Polányi, 1966). Thus a “trained-eye objectivity” 
came to replace the old mechanical one (Das-
ton and Galison, 2007: 329).3 
2)  Despite being a kind of culture, contempo-
rary science cannot be subsumed under cul-
tural relativism (LOC2 or LOC3). It is exceptional 
among the cultures, not because of its excep-
tional methodology or epistemic excellence, 
simply because it succeeded in establishing 
universal epistemic systems in several of its 
disciplines. To put it bluntly, Hopi conception 
of time, Maori epistemology, African tradi-
tional cosmologies, Zande witchcraft and the 
like cannot be regarded as alternatives to the 
scientific conceptions. Such examples demon-
strate epistemic relativism only if the validity 
of their separate justificatory frameworks are 
acknowledged as “scientific”. But if they would, 
then they should not be exempted from the 
selective pressure prevailing in science and 
this would result in ceasing the alternative 
conceptions. 
Thanks to the special social setting of the culture 
of science, all the reasons for relativism revealed 
by SSK (social legitimation and historical change 
17
Laki
of the norms of rationality; the symmetry the-
sis; the empirical flexibility of interpretations; 
social constructivism) can be endorsed without 
accepting synchronous relativism. This certainly 
does not mean that such communities obtain an 
absolute perspective: science remains a human 
culture, but at least not fragmented into synchro-
nous local points of view, its relativism has only 
one dimension.
18
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Notes
1  The following summary is based on Nye 1980 and 1986, and Klotz 1980 and 1986.
2  I cite the two versions of Wood’s paper from the appendix attached to Ashmore 1993 because there the 
lines are numbered. The text denoted by ‘A’ was originally published in Nature 1904; the one marked 
by ‘B’  in Seabrook 1941. The numbers indicate the lines of the respective text-versions published by 
Ashmore. 
3  As an illustration of the change, have a glimpse at the description how the neurologists learn to see an 
EEG-chart:
“stage I: nothing makes any sense, stage II: you think you understand but you see abnormalities every-
where,  stage III: you gain more hindsight. You recognize a spike but wonder if it is actually significant, 
stage IV: you are finally able to form your opinion, even if it is different from your teacher’s. This last stage 
is the sign you have matured. You have acquired enough experience to have your own opinion and to 
discuss an EEG (Crespel and Gélisse, 2005: 13)”.
Science & Technology Studies 32(1)
